

THE BALKANS AS EUROPE,
1821-1914

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and *Ethnicity in the Nineteenth Century* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1981), 75–91. Henry Roberts, *Rumania: Political Problems of an Agrarian State* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1951), is a classic attempt to integrate agriculture and high politics. See also John R. Lampe and Marvin R. Jackson, *Balkan Economic History 1550–1950: From Imperial Borderlands to Developing Nations* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982).

CHAPTER ONE

BALKAN INITIATIVES TO MAKE EUROPE

Two Cases from Mid-Nineteenth-Century Dalmatia

Dominique Kirchner Reill

Over the last two centuries, historians have committed themselves to the task of defining Europe, of defining what it is and what made (or makes) it. Scholars have adopted various approaches, from *longue durée* models tracing environmental, philosophical, and religious factors, to *courte durée* models narrating military, diplomatic, and economic developments.¹ What all of these histories share is a view that it was in Europe's power centers—Paris, Berlin, Amsterdam, Madrid, Vienna, Rome, and, yes, even London—that Europe originated. Constantine, Charlemagne, Napoleon, Marx, Metternich, Bismarck, Mazzini, and Monnet are just some of the usual figures who leap from the pages of treatises on the creation of a European order or a European consciousness. But were all the Euro-architects wielders of prestige? Were the centers of scientific innovation, religious hegemony, capital accumulation, or military might the preordained subjects in consolidating Europe's object peripheries into something grander, something European? My goal in this chapter is to show how the object of expansion, the periphery—in this case the Balkan periphery—could and did envision itself as a willing subject in making Europe, instead of just an object of the process. I do this through the example of two very different mid-nineteenth-century Dalmatian elites and their two very different plans for ways the Balkan maritime province of Dalmatia could serve as a model for Europeanization.

These elites saw Dalmatia not just as intrinsic to a Europeanizing project because the region connected western European commerce and intellectual

movements through its eastern Adriatic caravan routes to the core Balkan lands that crossed over into the Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean. They also saw Dalmatia as a microcosm of where much of the population diversity politics increasingly plaguing European communities was being played out. Dalmatia's population in the mid-nineteenth century counted about 5 percent who identified as Catholic Italian speakers (many of whom controlled local government and trade), 75 percent Catholic Slavic speakers, 20 percent Serb Orthodox Slavic speakers, with some influential micro-Sephardic Jewish and Albanian communities in some of its port towns. If Dalmatia could progress in its global outreach while peacefully negotiating its internal differences, should Europe not look to it as a useful test case for resolving similar issues throughout its many lands? The two Dalmatian elites who are the focus of this chapter, Luigi Serragli and Stripan Ivičević, believed so, and their stances remind us of the Balkan peripheries' willingness to make Europe a global core.

The Algerian Solution:

The 1851 Chamber of Commerce Resolution

In the spring of 1851, Dalmatian economic elites viewed their future within the Habsburg Empire with great unease. At that exact moment, in far-off Vienna, barons and earls around the newly anointed emperor, Franz Joseph, were trying to determine how to consolidate the territories they had come so close to losing in the revolutions of 1848–49. To do so, Vienna statesmen looked to the economy, determined to find ways to stimulate the imperial spreadsheet so that it would stop bleeding red and start showing black. The most famous of these initiatives (and perhaps the most successful) was the new Austrian *Zollverein* (customs union), which, once put into place, would abolish the tariffs imposed on trade between most of the lands controlled politically by Vienna.² Not all territories under Viennese supervision would partake in the union, however, and membership in the *Zollverein* was determined by the powers that be in the imperial court. The Kingdom of Dalmatia—a land controlled by Vienna since 1815 that hugged the eastern Adriatic coast from Zadar south to Dubrovnik—was one of the largest Vienna-controlled territories that had been consistently deemed unfit for inclusion in the tariff union with sister Habsburg lands. Dalmatian elites knew that Viennese statesmen could go either way as to whether Dalmatia should be included or excluded from the post-1849 *Zollverein* and all agreed that one way or another the decision would have far-reaching effects. Dalmatian elites well understood that their kingdom was poor, the second-poorest of the entire Habsburg realm,

and that trade initiatives were central to advancing the province's status and its inhabitants' standard of living.³

Dalmatians viewed the new wave of attention that Viennese imperial overlords were paying to economic reform as much as a moment of promise as of dread. Perhaps now the cause of the economic deficits of their underpopulated, maritime, and mountainous province would be addressed?⁴ Or perhaps now what little monies they received to administer their weak infrastructures and insufficient state services would be curtailed even further? Perhaps now the new emperor with his new liberal cabinet would look to Dalmatia and invest, so that she would no longer weigh on the imperial coffers? Or perhaps now a glance at the latest Dalmatian census reports would convince the *Herren in Wien*—the gentlemen in Vienna—even more that the dilemmas of Dalmatia had to be contained, that such problems had no place in a system of free-market enterprise? No one knew which way the tide would turn, but with typical Dalmatian black humor, most expected the worst.

Businessmen, large property holders, and local community leaders throughout Dalmatia debated face to face and in their correspondence about which imperial fiscal reforms would lighten or burden Dalmatia's economic challenges. Two primary camps emerged, the isolationist and the unionist. The isolationists argued that things should remain more or less as they had been since Dalmatia's incorporation into the Habsburg Empire after the Napoleonic Wars: Dalmatia should be treated as a separate economic entity from the rest of the empire, with tariffs imposed at a set rate regardless of whether trading partners hailed from Habsburg or non-Habsburg regions. The unionists argued the opposite: Dalmatia's lack of a privileged trading status with Habsburg lands had doomed her to financial oblivion. Without a special status, her olive oil, wines, nuts, and fruits were not being "priced" to sell to her fellow northern Habsburg sister lands. As unionists saw it, without inclusion in a tariff union, Dalmatia's Mediterranean harvests had to compete with other, more enticing, Mediterranean suppliers hailing from the Italian peninsula, France, Spain, Greece, and the Ottoman Empire. Isolationists countered that Dalmatian commerce would only improve once it could compete, and that her maritime position required that she sell to any buyer. Unionists then responded that Dalmatia was too far behind to compete, but that what she could offer would sustain northern Habsburg markets' demands, and that to everyone's benefit. All the parties involved in these discussions knew that they had little say in what reforms would ultimately be introduced. For not only would Vienna make the final call, but Dalmatia itself did not have a legislative assembly, did not have any sort of effective political or economic representation, and therefore had little sway in the higher echelons of power. Hence, Dalmatians' debates about tariffs and infrastructure were geared

to the ears of the military administrators of their province, in the hopes that these would inform their higher-ups of what "natives" had to say about their potential futures.

It was in this climate that Luigi Serragli (1816–80), a member of the province's chamber of commerce, suggested that Dalmatia needed a reciprocal trade policy with Austria "along the lines of the recent French laws regarding commercial relations with Algeria."⁵ When the issue was put to a vote, the chamber of commerce agreed that Dalmatia needed a policy with Austria just like the one Algeria had with France. Undoubtedly, to the modern ear, this suggestion and its endorsement seem bizarre. Did Dalmatians really want to be Vienna's Algeria? Did Serragli—an upright forty-three-year-old Dubrovnik businessman and local bureaucrat—and his colleagues who voted in favor of his idea think of Dalmatia as a land similar to the recently conquered portions of the Barbary Coast? Did Dalmatia want to be colonized by Austria as Algeria had just been by France? Or did this deliberate self-identification with France's newly vanquished "savage Other" point to an ingrained sense among Dalmatians of the role the Balkans had been assigned in Western, and Habsburg, cultural mindscapes, as Maria Todorova and Larry Wolff have suggested?⁶

Before any of these questions can be answered, we must take a moment to clarify how truly strange it was for a Dalmatian to hanker after an Algerian solution. As many scholars have argued, Algeria became part of the French Empire in a manner that few would have wished for themselves, and in a manner remarkably different from how Dalmatia had been joined to Austria. While Dalmatia had been peacefully and conclusively ceded to the Habsburg royal house by parlor diplomats at the Congress of Vienna, Algeria had been forcibly taken by the French in a bloody, costly, and drawn-out war fought against indigenous Algerians.

French claims on Algeria were not just different in kind from Habsburg claims on Dalmatia because of the discrepancy in bloodshed to enlarge empire, although the traumas of bloodshed should never be underestimated. In 1815, when the Habsburgs took up the Kingdom of Dalmatia, they cited local dynastic rights going back centuries. As such, though governed by a military administration, natives of Dalmatia were encouraged, if not prompted, to see themselves as natural subjects of their divinely-chosen monarch. In 1830, France's claim to Algeria was posited as a colonial mission *par excellence*. The liberal deputy Hypolite Passy recalled in 1834 that with the conquest of Algeria Frenchmen saw their new territory as "a soil of admirable fecundity to which streams of European population would soon flood. . . . It was an entire continent that we would summon to the benefits of industry and civilization; in a word, glory, power, wealth, all that flatters the pride, all that makes the

grandeur and prosperity of nations, we would find it all, see it all grow and flourish under the African sky."⁷ In essence, where Dalmatia's inclusion into the Habsburg realms signified an expansion of territory with an expansion in the number of Habsburg subjects, France's conquest of Algeria signified a colonial land grab where a "Neo-Europe," to borrow Alfred Crosby's phrase, would be colonized by a "flood" of Europeans who would wield their power with little consideration of those who currently lived under "the African sky" and exploit the country's resources for the benefit of metropolitan France.⁸ Dalmatia after 1815 was considered just another Habsburg possession, perhaps a peculiar and impoverished one.⁹ Algeria after 1830 was considered "a new Indies," with all the implicit racist and economically domineering traits of such an imperial relationship.¹⁰

Luigi Serragli and his peers in Dalmatia's chamber of commerce were hardly unaware of France's policy toward Algeria. Newspapers throughout Europe and in Dalmatia from 1830 on reported France's attack, siege, and brutal suppression of Algerian natives in order to stabilize her rule.¹¹ Once conquered, Algeria was nothing more or less than a colonial jewel of the French Empire. How Algeria was incorporated into France and what France's goals were for its incorporation were not a secret kept from Dalmatian eyes or ears. Journalists in such widely read papers as the populist *La Presse*, the liberal *La Revue des deux mondes*, and the conservative *Journal des Débats* reported almost daily on the parliamentary debates in Paris concerning the Algerian conquest and filled their columns with bombastic illustrated battle tales of France's heroic fighting against Algerian natives, the Berbers. Dalmatian elites had access to these articles, not just via French newspapers available in the local cafés and casinos in urban port centers, but also through their regional newspapers, such as the *Osservatore triestino* (Trieste Observer), which consistently lifted information from French news sources to fill its own columns. The press—whether the original French reports or the lifted Adriatic versions of them—regularly portrayed the prize of Algeria as farmland for France, ripe for landless or impoverished Europeans to occupy and plough. There was no doubt that Dalmatians knew that Algeria was no mere imperial province or crown land, such as their land was to Austria. Algeria was a colony, to be filled by colonizers. Did Serragli and his cohort of Dalmatian elites, then, wish the same fate for themselves?

If the question is whether Dalmatian elites wanted impoverished farmers and unemployed bureaucrats from Vienna, Vorarlberg, and Carinthia to settle Dalmatia, then the answer would be overwhelmingly negative. Throughout the entire Habsburg rule of Dalmatia, locals feared and complained about foreigners and outsiders being assigned posts within the Dalmatian administration. Land rights were also a constant bone of contention in Dalmatia.

Although there was no one agricultural system that dominated between the kingdom's capital, Zadar, in the north and the naval bases of Dubrovnik in the south, or between the island of Korčula, offshore to the west, and the inland hub of Knin, to the east, everywhere *colons*, day laborers, sharecroppers, absentee landowners, and feudal holders complained and argued about the injustices and insufficient protections offered by the Habsburg system, both to those who worked the land and to those who owned it.¹² The idea of outsiders coming in to settle Dalmatia, either its infrastructures or its lands, provoked panic, not longing. Work, good land, and a good income were hard enough to find in Dalmatia. Outsiders were definitely not welcome to come in floods to displace any locals via settlement.

If they did not desire to be conquered and they did not desire to be colonized, what, then, did Serragli and his chamber of commerce colleagues see in the Algerian solution that was better than the Habsburg solutions Dalmatians had experienced thus far? The answer, in a word, was a word: "reciprocal." Traditionally, reciprocal treaties—whether relating to tariffs, trade, or something else—are made between two separate, usually sovereign, entities. In the eighteenth century, England instituted reciprocal tariff agreements with Portugal under which the normal tariffs on Portuguese wine and English wool were abolished to counter French and Spanish competition.¹³ So, too, before cementing the North German *Zollverein*, individual German states in the early nineteenth century had instituted bilateral reciprocal tariff agreements to ease mutual trade. Before 1851, France's reciprocal agreements would have not mustered much attention from a Dalmatian readership, as they followed the traditional reciprocity formulas described earlier. But what caught Dalmatians' attention about the Algerian case was that a metropole, France, instituted a reciprocal trade agreement with a subject of its own empire, Algeria—indeed, with an entity that, at least on paper, comprised three French *départements*.¹⁴

The new feature of this arrangement was not tariff reductions within an imperial relationship. Dalmatia herself had enjoyed reduced tariffs when selling wine to Habsburg lands throughout the 1840s. What caught Dalmatians' attention was that this "reciprocal" agreement treated each of the two trading entities as separate units, granting "exceptions" outside of the bilateral agreement specifically suited to the imperial periphery's benefit. Before the 1851 reciprocal agreement, most French goods could be sold to Algerian markets with no tariffs, while most Algerian goods had duties levied on them when they entered France. Most foreign (Piedmontese, Spanish, Ottoman, British) goods sold to or bought from Algeria also incurred tariffs at a rate proportional to mainland French duties. What this all meant was that before 1851, France had a fairly unbalanced imperial trade relationship with Algeria,

mostly to France's benefit and Algeria's loss. After the 1851 reciprocal agreement, almost all French and Algerian products traded freely across the Mediterranean. Import tariffs for most items were fixed at the same level for metropole and colony, while duties placed on selling to "foreign" markets were instituted based on the interests of each entity. In other words, after 1851, France and Algeria worked within the same tariff union. As a general rule, to boost Algerian productivity, Algeria was freed from all export duties on products destined for foreign countries, excepting some products that would compete directly with French producers.¹⁵ This in essence bolstered ties between metropole and peripheral colony, while positioning the colony's economy to reap the benefits of selling duty-free when competing with other, non-French, Mediterranean suppliers.

There is no doubt that France's change in tariff policy with Algeria was designed to stimulate a weak Algerian economy and thereby to help harmonize its inclusion within the French economy, now that it was an extended member of the grand *Hexagone*—metropolitan France. From the outset, France's designs on Algeria were as much economically driven as anything else. As the journalist and political economist André Cochut outlined in one of his several articles on the Algerian situation that were published in the *Revue des deux mondes*, most French citizens eager to include Algeria within France's empire believed that "colonization is but an affair of industry on a grand scale [*sur une échelle immense*]. What has been missing until now among all the projects so far known is precisely the minute foresight, the instinct for speculation. What are the possible means within each network [*système*] to ease the expenses on the metropole, to attract capital, to retain good workers and to constitute in Africa a population worthy enough of being called French?"¹⁶

In essence, France's 1851 reciprocal agreement was the answer to this question. It was an initiative of "minute foresight" aimed at attracting capital, creating employment, and easing the strains on the metropole's responsibilities to keep its imperial province's budget afloat. Seen in these terms, the 1851 reciprocal trade agreement was a development plan whereby, with the proper attention, Algeria would go from being a "cursed land" to becoming a "sister of France . . . a new France," as the French historian, journalist, and former Napoleonic officer Louis-François L'Héritier de l'Ain proclaimed.¹⁷

An imperial economic policy to transform a "cursed land" into a "new France"—or, more generally, a "new Europe"—was exactly what Dalmatians viewed with envy. In this vein, Serragli outlined to his colleagues how a reciprocal tariff agreement *à l'algérienne* would serve as a "transitional phase" both between the isolationist and unionist positions and between Dalmatia's status as an appendage to the Habsburg economic regime and as a fully fledged

organ of the imperial system.¹⁸ Serragli explained that a reciprocal trade agreement between Dalmatia and Austria would work as follows: All of the most important Dalmatian products would be put on the Austrian market free of tax, and the same would be the case for those from Austria in Dalmatia. Furthermore, a new tariff of 3 to 15 percent would be set up for Dalmatia for foreign imports, depending on need. On the whole, Dalmatian products would be traded tax-free outside of Dalmatia and commerce restrictions would be lifted on navigation.

A reciprocal policy allowing Dalmatia to trade freely outside of the Habsburg Empire would serve as a check to black market smuggling with Ottoman Bosnia to the east and the Italian peninsula to the west.¹⁹ A reciprocal policy abolishing tariffs between Dalmatia and other Habsburg lands would allow Dalmatia's Mediterranean harvests to sell faster in the market squares of Prague, Lviv, and Vienna. With a reciprocal policy, capital investment into Dalmatia would be encouraged, precisely because issues of smuggling and narrow markets would be resolved.²⁰ In essence, members of the Dalmatian Chamber of Commerce voted for and applauded the Algerian solution because they believed that it promised to remake their economy into one "worthy of being called Habsburg," "worthy of being called European," just as France's policies promised to make the former Barbary States a land "worthy of being called French."²¹

This 1851 Algerian vote is very relevant to Balkan initiatives to unite Europe. First, it demonstrated the ability of imperial subjects on the European continent to compare their situation to that of overseas colonies. Too often, historians and theorists have categorized these histories as distinctively different, pointing to the unbridgeable gap between racialist attitudes and colonizing infrastructures that render the land-based imperial expansions of the Habsburg, Ottoman, Prussian, and Russian Empires somehow incomparable with the overseas colonial pursuits of the French, British, Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, Italians, and Germans.²² Serragli and the Dalmatian Chamber of Commerce did not make too much of these differences and focused instead on similarities. One European metropole (France) had initiated an economic policy with its imperial subject that struck their fancy and they proposed that their own European metropole (Austria) follow suit. For these Dalmatian elites, what was at issue was the best policy of European imperialism, whether colonial or not. In the comparability of the French and Habsburg systems, the similarity of European imperial aims to a large extent outweighed each empire's particular features.

But perhaps more important in the 1851 Chamber of Commerce vote in favor of an Algerian solution was the desire to be incorporated into empire

in a manner resembling the neo-Europes taking shape throughout the rest of the globe. Historians looking at the strategies, hopes, and fears in the nineteenth century have often explained the similarity between the goals of Balkan elites and those of their contemporaries in Britain and France by categorizing them as following the "liberal school" or "conservative school" of European thought. The omnipresence of arguments and programs using rhetoric that relied on terms such as "progress" and "Providence," "nation" and "liberty" have seemed to reveal that peripheries such as Dalmatia followed the trends of western Europe and tried to emulate them, often in circumstances particularly unsuitable for flattering imitation. But perhaps peoples in the Balkans wanted much more than merely to follow continental trends? Perhaps at least some of them wanted to trump the trends, and wealth in a more complicit manner than their western European contemporaries ever dreamed? Perhaps being part of an empire was not just something to be endured, but could actually be turned into a responsibility to be harmonized, to be united with Europe? Perhaps Balkan elites like Serragli and his cohort wanted to turn the tables on their subject status and require the enlightened mission of their imperial masters to bear fruit and bring some sort of homogeneity of economic standards, if not status?²³ By directly pointing to France's project for Algeria, one could argue that Dalmatian elites were pushing aside old models of their expected "backward" role in Europe. Algeria was a model home of a "new France," one we have learned was not the dreamland the French had hoped it would be, but one whose design was nonetheless seen by Dalmatians as representing something new: reciprocity, unity, a means to be part of an evolving Europe.

The New Cosmopolitan Art: Pangrafia

At the same time of Serragli's presentation to the Dalmatian Chamber of Commerce, another Dalmatian businessman, Štipan Ivičević (1801–71), was trying to convince Habsburg elites in Vienna that he had discovered a means to consolidate bureaucratic and commercial interactions between the empire's vast array of different national and linguistic groups, and possibly the whole world. Born in 1801 near the small port of Makarska, about sixty miles north of Dubrovnik, Ivičević—a local community leader, businessman, journalist, and amateur linguist—shared many of Serragli's concerns and convictions about Dalmatia's economic future. Like Serragli, Ivičević felt that Dalmatia's only chance for economic revival was by achieving some degree of free trade. As he succinctly put it in a letter to a friend, "Free trade with Bosnia and a free

port (*porto franco*), these are our true resources. Everything else is just smoke without a fire."²⁴ Dalmatia, in Ivičević's estimation, needed to be transformed into a commercial haven between sea and hinterland, a hub for Mediterranean and Balkan trade. Throughout the 1848–49 revolutions and in the immediate aftermath, Ivičević stuck to a fairly consistent three-point plan for the economic revival of his province, which he outlined as follows: "Dalmatia needs to strive for: 1. Void the cordon against Herzegovina. 2. Free port 3. Political, or at least commercial, union with Bosnia." If he had been at the Dalmatian Chamber of Commerce meeting, he would no doubt have voted in favor of the Algerian solution, hopeful that it would lead to a revival of legal caravan trade with the Ottoman states and the lifting of maritime custom taxes.²⁵

But though Ivičević wrote and spoke often about his position on favorable tariff arrangements for Dalmatia, this was not the project he badgered Viennese administrators about on an almost yearly basis. He had much larger projects in mind. His own strategy to center Dalmatia in imperial reform schemes was to create and disseminate his own universal system of written communication, which he called *Pangrafia universale*.²⁶ Pangrafia was Ivičević's lifelong passion. He began sending out exemplars of its methodology a few months before the 1848–49 revolutions broke out. Upon his death thirty years later, Ivičević was still fine-tuning it. His fixation with Pangrafia was based on what he hoped it could achieve. Overall, Ivičević's universal language system was meant to bridge divides inherent in a multilingual environment, which he believed was a way to resolve not just Dalmatia's woes, but also those of the Habsburg Empire, Europe, and perhaps even the whole world.

Ivičević believed that a universal language system would solve the troubles of his province, his empire, and his continent by ensuring that in multilingual environments—Dalmatia, the Habsburg Empire, Europe, and the world—language speakers closest to the centers of power would not enjoy privileges to the detriment of others. For example, Italian speakers in Dalmatia enjoyed obvious advantages over their Slavic-speaking compatriots, as did German speakers over everyone else in the Habsburg Empire. Ivičević, like the inventor of Esperanto thirty years later, L. L. Zamenhof, considered a universal language system to be the most fruitful means to defuse the conflicts inherent in a multilingual environment.

Ivičević's foundational concerns for Pangrafia centered around his fear of linguistic hegemony and his desire to ensure that nation formation would not translate into nation isolation. He decided that rather than develop a new language that everyone would use to communicate alongside their mother tongues it would be better to develop a formula of translation *between* different languages: a writing system that worked much like a calculator. By

simplifying a grammar system and alphabet, Ivičević proposed that people use his translation tables to move between their languages and his Pangrafia, communicating through linguistic conversion and deciphering. With his translation tables at hand, people of all languages could communicate in writing. It would not be necessary for all to adopt one language—not Italian, German, English, French, or even "South Slavic" (what Ivičević termed his own, and most beloved, language group). No single group would have more control or mastery of the language of trade or government. A clear separation would be placed between languages, an *interlingua*, so to speak, allowing communication without assimilation. Ivičević argued that the only means to secure mutually beneficial interactions among Europe's peoples was to filter between languages and national groups. Thinking of his own province, he imagined Slavic speakers no longer limited to manual labor because they were incapable of utilizing the languages of governance. With Pangrafia, speakers of Italian, and German, and Slavic languages would be able to work together without any one group being privileged or disadvantaged. Ivičević identified his new science as a "sign of the Century of Progress, which will dishonor neither Dalmatia nor the entirety of Austria."²⁷

Ivičević's formulaic translation scheme did not come with a newly invented vocabulary. Interestingly enough, he chose different languages at different political moments to serve as the base lexicon for his interlingua calculator. Before the 1848–49 revolutions he opted for Italian, explaining that he believed it to be "the easiest and most adaptable language . . . and understood by those who know Latin, the language of science."²⁸ After the 1848–49 revolutions he opted for German, for reasons he felt no need to explain. When the rulers of the Habsburg Empire showed themselves unwilling to adopt his plan, he solicited Napoleon III and Alexander II, trying French and Russian, respectively.

How would a language like Italian function as a lexicon and not a language? Simply due to the fact that in order for people to communicate between languages, all that was necessary was for them to have at hand a crossover dictionary of their language and Italian. Users of the Pangrafia system just needed to plug Italian words into the simplified Pangrafia grammar and universal communication would ensue. A Russian speaker from the Baltics could negotiate shipping terms with a Greek speaker from the Mediterranean as long as Russian-Italian and Greek-Italian dictionaries were on hand. The only benefit Italian speakers would have in this arrangement was that they would have to look up fewer words—though they would have to be careful to use standardized idioms and not dialects. Everyone would be equally advantaged or disadvantaged by their knowledge of Pangrafia's rules.

test was made on the same student on his eighth day of study, and "he translated very well into German (a language which he learned in school) a text written Pangrafically from German by someone who did not know how to properly write in German."³⁵ In the third case, a high school student trained in the Pangraphic science "translated well into Italian (his school language) and Illyrian (his mother tongue) a text written pangrafically from German: a language completely unknown to him." ("Illyrian" was considered a subset of South Slavic; today it would be recognized as Croatian.)³⁶

All three cases proved to Ivičević's satisfaction that language divides within a multinational province such as Dalmatia (or a multinational empire) could be avoided: Italian speakers would be able to comprehend English texts useful in maritime commerce. German speakers—bureaucrats in Vienna—would be able to comprehend documents written in German by those who did not have a strong grasp of the language, such as Dalmatia's home-born administrative clerks. And finally, German-language articles, such as Habsburg laws or military codes, would be intelligible to South Slavic and Italian speakers with no familiarity with German, a group that included the majority of Dalmatians in the mid-nineteenth century. "Through Pangrafia," Ivičević explained, "every one will be able to understand each other, at least in written form." He went so far as to boast that his "invention is perhaps more important for ideas than steamships were for objects."³⁷

Steamships were not just a metaphor Ivičević employed. The allusion to steamships made clear that Pangrafia was meant to be as much an instrument for the economic and administrative consolidation of a diverse conglomeration of lands as a means to tie together overseas communications. The global aims of Ivičević's project become clear when one analyzes the languages he incorporated within his system. Though Ivičević's Pangrafia focused mostly on European languages, including twenty-seven different tongues he believed represented most of the communication systems of his continent, Ivičević also included what he termed "Asian" varieties.³⁸ "Chinese, Persian, Hebrew, Arabic, Turkish" headed the list of non-European languages that users of his Pangraphic system could hope to decipher with the help of his interlingua.³⁹

The inclusion of Persian, Arabic, and Turkish demonstrates how this Mediterranean merchant had his eye firmly set on communicating with markets to the east and south, markets ever more attainable with the expansion of steamship service of Österreichischer Lloyd (founded in 1833) to ports in the Levant.⁴⁰ The presence of Chinese in Ivičević's bag of tricks reveals, however, that his thinking went beyond the field of likely Dalmatian or even Habsburg trade, but was also geared to greater European enterprises. In fact, the English-language experiments made with Dalmatians in his case

Chapter One

The example of Russian and Greek merchants using Pangrafia to write shipping contracts is not haphazard. From the outset, Ivičević envisioned his "new cosmopolitan art" in specifically economic terms.²⁹ Like any struggling businessman trying to sell his product in an increasingly globalized market, Ivičević was excited most by the commercial possibilities of connecting languages. As followers of Eric Hobsbawm and Ernest Gellner would undoubtedly appreciate, at heart *Pangrafia* was not just the key to how nations could communicate and bureaucracy could function. It also promised to resolve the problem of economic and commercial modernization in an increasingly "nationally" diverse Europe. Ivičević described his universal system as an enormous "factory of language," in which all the standardized languages and dialects of Europe would be compared and combined. Words in these "factories" were just "industrial materials," the primary materials manufactured and transported through the subfactories of individual languages and then packaged by the superfactory, Pangrafia.³⁰ In Pangrafia, no local language group would be superior to the other, for, Ivičević announced, "Just as the new metric system equalizes all the measurements of the different countries, so does the system of Pangrafia equalize all of the languages."³¹ To detractors who argued that the reinforcement of linguistic diversity was inviting another Tower of Babel, Ivičević responded, "Tower of Babel if you will, but not one of confusion; on the contrary, it is one of reunion."³²

Union (or reunion, depending on Ivičević's biblical frame of mind) of Europe's increasingly divergent parts was the goal he set for his Pangrafia. And like any amateur scientist, Ivičević composed experiments to prove the validity of his discovery. His guinea pig was the population of Dalmatia itself. Ivičević believed that Dalmatia was the perfect test case for his "new cosmopolitan art" because, within the confines of this small territory, the predominantly undereducated local population were regularly forced to communicate within a linguistic environment in her tangled bureaucracy that comprised German, Italian, and South Slavic languages while also coming into contact with even more languages at her ports and along her caravan trails. Ivičević published the results of three "experiments" he had conducted using Dalmatians as his experimental subjects, confident that Dalmatia's multilingualism was a microcosm that could represent the world of greater Europe.

In the first experiment, Ivičević had a "young and talented" university student from Dalmatia study the Pangrafia system one hour a day for ten days. On the eleventh day, the student was asked "to translate into Italian, his mother tongue, an article written Pangrafically from English, a language he did not know a word of [*di cui egli non conosceva un acca!*]"³³ According to Ivičević, "The translation corresponded very well to the text."³⁴ The second

studies and his inclusion of Chinese in his Pangrafic system make it clear that Ivičević hoped his “cosmopolitan art” would follow the paths of empires on which the sun never set. He made this point even more explicit in a letter to a friend in which he described his delight at “discovering” Pangrafia and contemplating its promise. Ivičević assured his friend that his new system could be used with great benefit “by the great European family. And then when you think about the Europeans scattered all over the world? . . . The idea is as big, as I am little.”⁴¹

Ivičević was not exaggerating when he called his idea big. In fact, this “little” man tucked away in the study of his little Balkan crown land was trying to unite “the European family” and simultaneously unite European imperial enterprises throughout the world. With Pangrafia, fellow Europeans who spoke different national languages would no longer be forced to assimilate or isolate themselves. Grand European empires would no longer be shaken by the divisions and difficulties of their populations’ linguistic diversity. The “Europeans scattered all over the world” would no longer be isolated from the peoples they were trading with, if not outright domineering. *Pangrafia*, the language superfactory, would resolve all of these dilemmas. And all that was needed was for the powers that be to promote its use.

To his considerable dismay, Ivičević’s greatest passion resulted in his bitterest disappointment. Time and time again he pleaded with Habsburg elites for financial and institutional backing to launch his program. In the first years of his quest things looked optimistic. In January 1849 Ivičević succeeded in gaining an audience with members of the Academy of Sciences in Vienna, where he petitioned them to consider his Pangrafia as a possible venture for imperial backing. Ivičević explained the glories of his system to a hall of linguists and political scientists. The academy published an official report on Pangrafia indicating that “without a doubt it could offer, for its simplicity and ingenuity, a great medium for facilitating daily written correspondence between nations of different languages,” but it refused to sponsor the project, citing the potentially dangerous discrepancies in using dictionaries as handbooks for universal communication.⁴²

Though disappointed, Ivičević did not give up. Instead, he turned to the man he considered the true father of all nations, the young Emperor Franz Joseph. In a painfully obsequious letter written “from one Slav to the King of Slavs,” Ivičević explained that his Pangrafia would eradicate miscommunication and unite the world in trade-oriented commercial harmony.⁴³ Now was the opportunity for Austria to lead the way, Ivičević asserted. Now was the time for the greatest Emperor of Europe to unite all Europeans. All Franz Joseph had to do was consent to have Ivičević represent him at the courts of

Europe to get their support as well.⁴⁴ Sadly, Franz Joseph never responded. Nor did any of the other crowned heads whom Ivičević contacted, crowned heads to whom he promised the means, through the example of the test cases of his Dalmatian subjects, to “draw closer and unite peoples in brotherly love [*affrattellare*] . . . and give to commerce a powerful means of communication without the wasted time of learning languages.”⁴⁵ Ivičević, able to look from his office over the port of his sleepy Dalmatian town, believed he had discovered a means to take all of Europe’s languages and simultaneously “infuse them together and spread them all out; like the waters into the sea, and from the sea.”⁴⁶ To Ivičević’s chagrin, the powers of Europe seemed blind to the promise of that kind of infusion.

Mid-Nineteenth-Century Dalmatians: Willing Architects for a New Europe

What can we learn from these two cases of mid-nineteenth-century Balkan elites who worked to incorporate their peripheral, impoverished, and powerless crown land into the designs of creating a new Europe or a newly united global Europe? First, they serve as yet another reminder that although these men were geographically and culturally located on the Balkan Peninsula, there was absolutely nothing “balkanized” about their outlooks. These activists both thought big—bigger than nationalism, bigger than Balkan intrigues, and bigger even than the vast Habsburg horizon.⁴⁷ They thought European, they thought macro, and they thought European global expansion well before the Suez Canal, the Franco-Prussian War, and the “Scramble for Africa.”

Second, their cases show how they identified Europeanization as a promise to extract Dalmatia from the misery of its current subaltern position. If Europe were remade, then Dalmatia would benefit. Conversely, if the problems afflicting Dalmatia were resolved, then this would show Europe a path toward growth. By “Europeanizing” Dalmatia’s infrastructures and markets through a neo-European development plan à l’algérienne, Austria could claim for itself an expansion of its European centers and another inlet for European wealth. By “Europeanizing” Dalmatia’s linguistic divides, Vienna would have a model for resolving its own multinational headache, as would the rest of Europe. In a way, Serragli, Ivičević, and many of their contemporaries attempted to twist the very logic that Maria Todorova has shown damned them in the first place. They would stop being a “Balkan Other” by defining, expanding, and remarking Europe to include them. If they succeeded, they would be a center. If they failed, they would continue to feel as if they were “isolated even more than if

they were surrounded by the Great Wall of China," a phrase coined by one of their contemporaries and countrymen, Ivan August Kaznačić, less than twenty years later, to describe what it felt like to live outside of European affairs.⁴⁸ As we know, they did fail.

Third, what these two cases show is that Euro-architects even outside the centers of political and financial power believed that the future of Europe lay in imperial consolidation and expansion. Serragli and his Chamber of Commerce voted in favor of Vienna's adopting a new form of imperialism, one that originally arose from the relationship of France with an overseas colony but that, they believed, would suit the Habsburg scene well. Ivičević set his project to resolve problems of the imperial administration as well as to help those "Europeans scattered all over the world." Toward the end of the 1848–49 revolutions, with the word "nation" on everyone's lips, it appears that nineteenth-century Europhiles were also convinced that empire was the path to progress, even at the peripheries. In fact, especially at the peripheries.

Notes

1. The literature on this topic is vast. See, for example, Robert Bartlett, *The Making of Europe: Conquest, Colonization, and Cultural Change, 950–1350* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); S. J. Woolf, *Napoleon's Integration of Europe* (London: Routledge, 1991); Anthony Pagden, *The Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to the European Union* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); E. L. Jones, *The European Miracle: Environments, Economies, and Geopolitics in the History of Europe and Asia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); M. S. Anderson, *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy, 1450–1919* (London: Longman, 1993).
2. On the effectiveness of this Austrian *Zollverein* see David F. Good, *The Economic Rise of the Habsburg Empire* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), chap. 4.
3. Konrad Clewing, *Staatlichkeit und nationale Identitätsbildung* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2001), gives an excellent analysis of Habsburg containment policies vis-à-vis Dalmatia (18–140).
4. For further discussion of the economic and political situation of Dalmatia in the mid-nineteenth century, see Josip Beroš, "Stav carskog dvora prema sjedinjenu Dalmacije s Hrvatskom," *Historijski preglad* 8, no. 3 (1962): 163–75; Stjepo Obad, "Sukob talijanskih i austrijskih interesa na Jadranu u revoluciji 1848/49. godine," *Pomorski zbornik* 6 (1968): 531–36; Stjepo Obad, "Dalmacija za vrijeme izlaženja Zore Dalmatinske," *Zadarska Smotra* 44, no. 3–4 (1995): 31–38; Nikiša

Stančić, *Milivoil Pavlinović i njegov krug do 1869* (Zagreb: Sveučilište u Zagrebu Centar za Povijesne Znanosti, Odjel za Hrvatsku Povijest, 1980).

5. Luigi Serragli, *Sulla Riforma doganale della Dalmazia* (Dubrovnik: Martecchini, 1851), 26. According to Serragli, "Delegates from [all of the provinces] Chambers of Commerce, and from the agronomy societies" attended the meeting (3).

6. Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); Larry Wolff, *Venice and the Slavs* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001).

7. Hypolite Passy, "Rapport de la commission du budget du ministère de la guerre," *Moniteur universel*, April 10, 1834.

8. Alfred W. Crosby, *Ecological Imperialism: The Biological Expansion of Europe, 900–1900* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

9. For a telling sign of how "peculiar and impoverished" Habsburg officials found Dalmatia upon initially visiting it during its first years as part of the empire, see Franz Graf Hohenwart's letter to Metternich of July 7, 1829, quoted in Clewing, *Staatlichkeit*, 62.

10. "Note de la Chambre de Commerce d'Alger en réponse au discours de M. Passy sur les dépenses de l'occupation d'Afrique, adressée aux Chambres législatives," *Moniteur universel*, May 9, 1834, cited in Jennifer Elson Sessions, "Making Colonial France: Culture, National Identity and the Colonization of Algeria, 1830–1851" (PhD diss., University of Pennsylvania, 2005), 47.

11. On the ubiquity of reports of the brutality and cost in manpower to subdue Algeria see *ibid.*

12. On *colons* in Dalmatia, see *Enciklopedija hrvatske povijesti i kulture* (Zagreb: Školska Knjiga, 1980), s.v. "Kolonat." On the whole, agricultural relations depended on how long the land had been held under the Venetian Republic before 1797. The *vecchio acquisto* (old acquisition) territories situated closer to the coast generally followed the *colón* (sharecropper) system predominant throughout most of the Mediterranean. The *nuovo* and *nuovissimo acquisti* (new and newest acquisitions), meanwhile, were organized either as feudal lands gifted to successful military generals or formed along the same lines as the Habsburg Empire's military border zone: in exchange for protecting against Ottoman incursions, armed families lived outside the jurisdiction of the state. Clearly, areas around Dubrovnik had their own history of agricultural relations. For an interesting discussion of Dubrovnik's commercial and agricultural position in the Early Modern Period see, for example, Francis W. Carter, *Dubrovnik (Ragusa): A Classic City-State* (London: Seminar Press, 1972), and his other works.

13. For more information on England's reciprocal treaty with Portugal, see Paul Duguid, "The Making of Methuen: The Commercial Treaty in the English Imagination," *Historia* 3, no. 4 (2003): 9–36.

14. For a concise general history of Algeria's incorporation as a French *département*, see John Ruedy, *Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005).

15. Per the agreement, export duties of any French goods into Algeria were abolished; free entrance of "a certain number" of Algerian "natural products" into France was allowed; and foreign products imported into Algeria needed to pay the same duties as if they had been imported into France via the Mediterranean ports (some exceptions to this rule existed for construction materials and products necessary for vegetable and animal reproduction, which were allowed to enter Algeria free of duties). For more information on the 1851 French-Algerian reciprocal tariff agreement, see Arthur Girault, *The Colonial Tariff Policy of France* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1916), 55–65.

16. André Cochut, "De la colonisation de l'Algérie: Plan et budget d'exploitation," *Revue des deux mondes* 10, no. 5 (1847): 252.

17. Louis-François L'Héritier de l'Ain, "Importance de l'Algérie sous le rapport de ses produits agricoles," *L'Afrique française* 1 (July 1837), cited in Sessions, "Making Colonial France," 128.

18. Serragli, *Riforma doganale*, 26.

19. *Ibid.*, 29.

20. Serragli discusses the importance of "attracting capital investment" throughout the pamphlet, but see especially *ibid.*, 24.

21. Cochut, "De la colonisation," 252.

22. In a very crude sense, the difference between imperialism and colonialism is usually defined with reference to Edward Said's generalization that "'imperialism' means the practice, the theory, and the attitudes of a dominating metropolitan center ruling a distant territory; 'colonialism,' which is almost always a consequence of imperialism, is the implanting of settlements on distant territory." Edward W. Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York: Knopf, 1993), 9.

23. For a fascinating discussion on how the "development" imperial model of mid-twentieth-century British, French, and Belgian imperialism was used by African elites as a means to demand more aid and sovereignty, if not out and out equality, see Frederick Cooper, *Africa Since 1940: The Past of the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 39–65.

24. Stipan Ivičević to Luigi Pavissich, April 25, 1848, in *Memorie macarensi*, ed. L. C. Pavissich (Trieste: E. Sambo & Co., 1897).

25. Stipan Ivičević to Luigi Pavissich, April 4, 1848, in Pavissich, *Memorie macarensi*. To this end, Ivičević, along with the lawyer Božidar Peranović and Ante Kuzmanić, the editor of *Zora dalmatinska*, tried to found a Dalmatian-Bosnian newspaper. Stipan Ivičević to Luigi Pavissich, May 9, 1848, in Pavissich,

Memorie macarensi; Stipan Ivičević to Luigi Pavissich, May 17, 1848, in Pavissich, *Memorie macarensi*. Ivičević also sought to convince Habsburg authorities to set up a railroad line that connected Dalmatia directly to Mostar, Sarajevo, and Belgrade. Stipan Ivičević to Luigi Pavissich, April 4, 1848, in Pavissich, *Memorie macarensi*.

26. Ivičević first described his "Pangrafia" in an 1847 letter to his friend Niccolò Tommaseo, stating that after having read and reread chapters 3 and 4 of Tommaseo's *Nuova proposta*, "by chance, some sparks [*scintille*] came to my mind; then a ray; then a light; and I think that I have devised a System for Universal Writing that is both very easy and very reasonable [*soddisfacente*]; —not numerical, but legible like any other language." Stipan Ivičević to Niccolò Tommaseo, November 29, 1847, in Tommaseo Carteggi 92.72.1.1, Florence National Library. For more information on Ivičević's discovery and how it was related to the nationality question in Dalmatia before and immediately after the 1848–49 revolutions, see Dominique Kirchner Reill, *Nationalists Who Feared the Nation: Adriatic Multi-nationalism in Habsburg Dalmatia, Trieste, and Venice* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012). For a fascinating discussion of the many different forms that Dalmatian national identity could take within the autonomous movement see Josip Vrandečić, *Dalmatinski autonomistički pokret u XIX stoljeću* (Zagreb: Dom i Svijet, 2002).

27. Stipan Ivičević to Antonio Augustino Grubissich, forwarded to Niccolò Tommaseo, November 29, 1847, in Tommaseo Carteggi 92.72.10, Florence National Library.

28. Stipan Ivičević to Niccolò Tommaseo, January 6, 1846, in Tommaseo Carteggi 92.72.7, Florence National Library.

29. Stipan Ivičević, "Pangrafia (1848)," in Pavissich, *Memorie macarensi*.

30. Stipan Ivičević to Antonio Augustino Grubissich, forwarded to Niccolò Tommaseo, November 29, 1847.

31. *Ibid.*

32. *Ibid.*

33. Stipan Ivičević, "Programma su un nuovo metodo di Pangrafia," *L'Avvenire di Ragusa* 1, no. 1 (1848).

34. *Ibid.*

35. *Ibid.*

36. *Ibid.*

37. *Ibid.*

38. Ivičević resolved the question of which dialects and languages to include with his typical pragmatism. The fourteen living languages he incorporated into his *Pangrafia* he defined as "the languages of State in Europe, which is enough

for my Chart." A comparison of how he dealt with the languages of Holland and Prussia exemplifies how he selected his "languages of State." The Prussian dialect was not included because the Prussian government used standardized German in its official missives. Holland, on the other hand, used its local Germanic dialect in laws and documents, so it was included. Pangrafia was thus an expression of the political realities of administration as much as of communication. And the presence of Illyrian and Polish—two languages that in 1847 were not official languages of state—made clear the future Ivičević envisioned for these regions. Stipan Ivičević to Antonio Augustino Grubissich, forwarded to Niccolò Tommaseo, November 29, 1847.

39. Stipan Ivičević, "Pangrafia: Introduzione," Spisi Obitelji—Stijepan Ivičević kut 2; V. Linguistika, Državni Arhiv u Zagrebu.

40. For a discussion of the expansion of the Österreichischer Lloyd line and its role in recasting the Habsburg Empire as a maritime empire, see Alison Frank, "The Children of the Desert and the Laws of the Sea: Austria, Great Britain, the Ottoman Empire, and the Mediterranean Slave Trade in the Nineteenth Century," *American Historical Review* 117, no. 2 (June 2012): 410–44; Alison Frank, "Continental and Maritime Empires in an Age of Global Commerce," *East European Politics and Societies* 25, no. 4 (November 2011): 779–84. See also Alison Frank, *Invisible Empire: A New Global History of Austria* (forthcoming).

41. Stipan Ivičević to Antonio Augustino Grubissich, forwarded to Niccolò Tommaseo, November 29, 1847.

42. Stipan Ivičević to Luigi Pavissich, February 2, 1849, in Pavissich, *Memorie macarensi*; Ivičević, "Revista del mio Sistema pangrafico del 1848," Spisi Obitelji—Stijepan Ivičević 802-II, Državni Arhiv u Zagrebu; Stipan Ivičević to Emperor Franz Joseph, March 16, 1849, Spisi Obitelji—Stijepan Ivičević 802-I-1-4, Državni Arhiv u Zagrebu.

43. Stipan Ivičević to Emperor Franz Joseph, March 16, 1849.

44. *Ibid.*

45. Stipan Ivičević to Niccolò Tommaseo, November 29, 1847.

46. Stipan Ivičević to Antonio Augustino Grubissich, forwarded to Niccolò Tommaseo, November 29, 1847.

47. Serragli would later be associated with the Italy-oriented Irredentist camp and Ivičević would associate himself with the proto-Yugoslav movement.

48. Ivan August Kaznačić to A. Kaznačić, September 8, 1869, RO-17017; CXCIII/78, Državni Arhiv u Dubrovniku.

CHAPTER TWO

THE HOMELAND AS TERRA INCOGNITA

Geography and Bulgarian National Identity, 1830s–1870s

Dessislava Lilova

The key role of geography as an instrument for national identity formation is one of the specific characteristics of Bulgaria in the nineteenth century. Geography was given a prominent place in the curriculum as soon as a Bulgarian secular education system was established. The first textbook on the subject was published in 1835. By the end of Ottoman rule, in 1878, the total number of geography textbooks for Bulgarian primary and high schools had reached 38 (54 if reprints are counted). In terms of the number of textbooks, geography was second only to Bulgarian language—69 primers (or a total of 107 with reprints)—and almost on a par with religion (31 textbooks, or a total of 58 with reprints). Considering that the Orthodox Christian religion and the Bulgarian language were the two unquestionable pillars of the emerging national identity, the fact that geography had an equal place in the curriculum with those two subjects is indicative of its importance in shaping a sense of national belonging. History was a significantly less developed discipline than geography. The educational system functioned without a textbook on the subject until 1844, and even after that the number of Bulgarian history textbooks (10; 16 with reprints) remained modest.

The priority of geography over history was an exception to the norm followed by European educational systems in this period. In Europe, geography was regarded as an auxiliary discipline and usually was taught as part of other